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Summary
The customary tenure of reef areas in many parts of
the South Pacific offers an obvious context within
which fishery resources might be managed coopera-
tively between customary-rights owners and fisheries
personnel in government, yet the local foundations
for such co-management have received little critical
attention. Seven customary fishing rights areas
(CFRAs) in Fiji were the focus of the present study,
the objective being to compare management of
CFRAs subject to differing levels of fishing access
and ascertain those factors most influential to local
management practices. The intensity of access
(‘access pressure’) was measured as the number of
licences issued per CFRA and per unit area, while
management was assessed as an index, based on
evidence of five aspects of management (manage-
ment structure, marshalling of information for
management, approach to goodwill payments,
management measures and patrolling and enforce-
ment) derived from questionnaires. Management
varied amongst the CFRAs, one of the seven being
essentially unmanaged because of a breakdown in
succession between chiefs. There was little evidence
for management responding uniformly to access
pressure; rather, two CFRAs evinced a certain
management aptitude regardless of this pressure,
and two other CFRAs evinced relatively little
management although pressure was high. A simple
survey technique can indicate useful contrasts
amongst CFRAs in functional local management,
and thus be useful for guiding decisions about where
to make investments in local management or co-
management.
Keywords: customary tenure, fisheries, management, fishing
rights
Introduction
In many parts of the South Pacific, coastal fishing is subject
to the customary tenure of kinship groups. Such tenure typi-
cally extends to the seaward limit of coral reefs and has been
referred to as customary marine tenure (CMT) (e.g.
Johannes et al. 1993). Pinkerton (1989) and others (e.g.
Munro & Fakahau 1993) have argued that CMT systems
should be viewed positively by governments since they
provide a vehicle by which state and customary stakeholders
may work in partnership to share the burden of management,
in what is termed co-operative management or co-manage-
ment (e.g. Jentoft 1989), but many types of dialogue may
occur between local and central-governmental managers (Sen
& Nielsen 1996).
Fiji is remarkable in possessing a well-established system
of traditional fishing grounds known as qoliqoli which enjoy
some legal recognition, are officially referred to as customary
fishing rights areas (CFRAs) and appear to be the only case
worldwide where such tenure has been accurately mapped
(N.K. Dulvy, personal communication 1999). Some Fijian
CFRA owners have been taking it upon themselves to
manage their fishing grounds (Adams 1993), and it has been
proposed (IUCN 1993) that targeted investments should be
made to develop one or more Fijian CFRAs as models for
joint management by state and customary owners, with the
intention that successful experimentation in one CFRA could
facilitate the expeditious development of effective manage-
ment in other CFRAs. To date, such investment does not
appear to have been made, in spite of the apparently
favourable circumstances in Fiji and the wide interest in
alternatives to science-based fisheries management (e.g.
Roberts 1997).
Four fundamental attributes of Fijian CFRAs need to be
understood before embarking on any assessment thereof.
Firstly, tribal lands and coastal waters in Fiji are traditionally
regarded as a single, indivisible unit, which, together with its
indigenous people, is referred to as a vanua, which may
comprise one or more yavusa; each yavusa corresponds to a
clan and its lands and waters. Each yavusa is subdivided into
one or more mataqali (sub-clans). The Chief of a vanua (the
‘Chief Paramount’) is traditionally regarded as the owner or
supreme guardian of the land, waters, resources and people of
the vanua. Every indigenous Fijian is registered at birth as
belonging to a particular mataqali (and therefore vanua and
yavusa). The boundaries of the vanua and yavusa correspond
to modern administrative boundaries (Ravuvu 1983).
Secondly, CFRAs correspond with the recognized bound-
aries of vanua or yavusa according to whether, historically,
the fishing grounds have been subdivided between several
yavusa or maintained as a single CFRA shared between
several yavusa of the same vanua. While lands are further
subdivided to the mataqali level, fishing grounds have mostly
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been maintained as larger units. CFRA boundaries are legally
registrable and generally extend to the seaward limit of the
coral reef (Waqairatu 1994). CFRAs collectively are referred
to as demarcated waters (Fisheries Act Regulations, Cap
158).
Thirdly, every indigenous Fijian is traditionally regarded
as having the right to fish the qoliqoli (and therefore CFRA)
of his own yavusa (Ravuvu 1983; Waqairatu 1994). While the
customary right does not in theory extend to Indo-Fijians,
who make up a little over 50% of the population, in practice
Indo-Fijians are allowed to fish for subsistence in the qoliqoli
applicable to the district in which they are registered on the
electoral roll (Ratu Soso Katonivere, Tui Tavua and others,
personal communications 1994).
Fourthly, the Fisheries Act 1942 (Cap 158) requires
anyone fishing commercially inside one or more CFRAs to
obtain a licence from the government. Such a licence will not
be issued without a written permit from the Commissioner
for the Division (the largest unit of administration in Fiji) in
which the relevant CFRAs are located. According to the
legislation, the Commissioner may impose conditions on the
permit, including restrictions on fishing area, method, season
and species. Before issuing such permission, the Divisional
Commissioner must ‘consult’ the owners of the CFRAs
concerned and, by well-established practice, will only issue a
permit in accordance with written permission of the CFRA
owner. One important consequence of this elaborate
procedure is that the CFRA owner is able to impose legally
binding management restrictions upon the permission to fish
commercially.
Fong (1994) provided the first detailed study of a
customary management system in respect of any CFRA in
Fiji, noting in that particular case (Macuata on the large
island of Vanua Levu) the existence of a degree of collabor-
ation between the customary owner and the Fisheries
Division. The purpose of the present study was to compare
stakeholder management amongst a number of CFRAs
around the principal island of Viti Levu, and to explore the
factors that might be expected to influence any variations in
management practice, including the intensity of access to
resources (‘access pressure’) and degree of collaboration with
government authorities.
Methods
Study areas
Studies were carried out during May–July 1994 on a cluster
of CFRAs in north-western Viti Levu (hereafter ‘Region 1’)
(Fig. 1). Following a review of methodology and results from
the first region, investigations were extended to a cluster of
CFRAs in eastern Viti Levu (‘Region 2’). Both study regions
have a relatively high population density and had previously
been described as being subject to ‘moderate to high’ fishing
pressure (Zann 1992). Region 1 is mainly sunny and dry,
supporting substantial sugar-cane cultivation and an 
Indo-Fijian population that is higher than average. Region 2
is mainly cloudy and wet, its population is almost entirely
indigenous-Fijian in make-up, with virtually no Indo-Fijian
commercial fishing.
Region 1
Four CFRAs were studied in Region 1, namely Tavua,
Votua, Ba and Vitogo.
Tavua CFRA is owned by the Tui Tavua who at the time
of the study was also the Minister responsible for Fisheries,
and he regards the CFRA as the property of his family. An
unusual feature of Tavua was the presence of deep-water
fishing inside the CFRA limits, and dynamite fishing was
considered a particular problem. A few years prior to the
study, two boats belonging to Honorary Fisheries Wardens
(unpaid government appointees) had been dynamited by
persons unknown, widely believed to have been fishers who
had been informed upon by the Wardens for dynamite
fishing.
Votua is jointly owned by the three yavusa of Votua
village, who were traditionally the personal fishers (gonedau)
of the Tui Ba. While chiefly power (i.e. power residing in the
chief ) over the three yavusa had previously been held by a
single family, the family line had died out, and thus owner-
ship of the qoliqoli became vested jointly in the three yavusa.
They own few lands, so that the CFRA is their principal
asset. A unique feature of Votua is that access by most fishers
to the fishing ground is along the Ba estuary past Votua
village, facilitating policing by the customary-rights holders.
Votuans have a reputation for militant enforcement of their
fishing ground and were the first in Region 1 to impose an
access fee in 1988.
Ba CFRA (full name Ba and Tilivabukuya) is owned
by the Tui Ba, who regards herself as sole owner. A
unique feature is that most fishers using Ba are day-fishers
(A. Raiwalui and J. Ah-Tong, personal communications
1994).
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Figure 1 Diagrammatic map of Viti Levu in Fiji, showing
the locations of the CFRAs: 1 5 Tavua; 2 5 Votua; 3 5 Ba;
4 5 Vitogo; 5 5 Verata; 6 5 Kubuna; 7 5 Levuka.
Vitogo (full name Vitogo and Vidilo) is registered in the
names of the Vanua of Vitogo and the Yavusa of Vidilo.
While ownership rested with the Tunuloa yavusa of the
Vitogo vanua, chiefly power in Vitogo had been transferred to
a rival family, which apparently denied the Tunuloa yavusa
the right to manage the CFRA. The attitude of the Tunuloa
Chief (which was atypical for the CFRAs studied) was that
the government now owned the CFRA (the people retaining
only the right to fish) and was responsible for management. A
significant feature of Vitogo is that it embraces the city of
Lautoka (Fiji’s second largest urban centre) and is undoubt-
edly subject to heavy subsistence fishing pressure and, in the
view of the owner, significant unlicensed commercial fishing.
Region 2
Three CFRAs, or assemblages of CFRAs, were studied in
Region 2, namely Verata, Kubuna and Levuka.
Verata is an assemblage of three CFRAs, namely Verata
No. 1, Verata No. 2 and Verata & Namena, the last of which
is shared with the Namena vanua. The attitude of Verata
management is one of full ownership. There was a substantial
subsistence fishery (Passfield 1994).
Kubuna is owned by the Tui Kubuna, the highest-ranking
Chief of Fiji, who regards herself as full owner of the fishing
ground. Kubuna CFRA is rich in reefs and being close to
Suva, it was thought by the owner to be subject to significant
poaching, a contention supported by van der Meeren (1996),
who identified a number of management issues related to the
lack of community participation in the management of this
fishing ground.
The Levuka CFRA is owned by Tui Levuka who at the
time of the study resided at Levuka and regarded himself as
owner of the fishing ground. Noteworthy features of Levuka
are its distance from any large urban centres, a very wet
climate and the presence of the tuna canning factory of the
98% nationally-owned company PAFCO.
Assessment of CFRA fisheries
The study focused on the commercial artisanal fishery oper-
ating inside CFRAs. Licensing data were obtained from the
Fisheries Division’s own records (maintained at District
offices) and the records of the Divisional Commissioner. In
most cases, the Fisheries Division gave the highest number of
licences, suggesting that sources elsewhere were less
complete. A combination of these sources was used to
provide information on the number and type of licensed
fishing vessels permitted to fish in a given CFRA. Such infor-
mation provided an a priori measure of the commercial
artisanal-fishing access pressure in a given CFRA. Fisheries
officers were routinely consulted on any question of
interpretation or reliability concerning the Fisheries Division
data.
A total of seven fishers were questioned closely on their
fishing activities (five from Region 1, two from Region 2),
questionnaires (Cooke 1994) being used as a framework for the
interviews, although not completed by the fishers
themselves. Visits were made to markets and to landing points
in order to identify the species represented in the fisheries.
Middlemen, fish merchants and boat builders were questioned
in a semi-structured manner on various aspects of the fisheries.
CFRA managers did not themselves have data on rates of
resource extraction from specific CFRAs, and although they
were aware that their CFRAs were sometimes subject to
poaching, they had no means of quantifying fishing pressure.
Thus, the only statistic for which they had reliable infor-
mation on which to base a management response was the
number of permits they had themselves issued for the CFRA.
An a priori measure of fishing access pressure was therefore
obtained by dividing the number of permits by the area of the
CFRA. Interviews with fishers, Fisheries officers and others
indicated that artisanal fishing was influenced by the distri-
bution and accessibility of different ecosystems within
CFRAs (e.g. open water, mangrove and coral reef ). Data on
the number of fishing permits were obtained from official
records retained by the Fisheries Division and District
Commissioner’s offices, and additionally from CFRA owners
who retained such records. Total areas of CFRAs were
measured from Native Lands and Fisheries Commission
maps, while the areas of reef and mangrove in CFRAs were
measured from published 1:50 000 maps.
Inspection of several hundred licence records at Lautoka
and Ba Fisheries offices revealed that only a handful of fishers
had obtained permits to fish in more than one CFRA over a
period of several years. Fisheries officers at Ba and Lautoka
expressed the opinion that fishers frequently strayed into
CFRAs adjacent to those for which they were licensed
although evidence of the practice had not been systematically
gathered. A consequence of the fishers practice of each
obtaining a permit for only one CFRA would be that the
number of issued licences for a given CFRA could be greater
or less than the number of vessels actually operating in that
area. However, in the absence of any means for quantifying
this form of poaching, there was no basis for taking it into
account in the measurement of resource access pressure.
Thus, just two indices of access pressure were generated,
namely (1) the absolute number of permits per CFRA and (2)
the number of licences divided by the surface area of the
CFRA in question (or the area of reef within the CFRA). The
latter index was used to compare access pressure amongst
CFRAs.
Assessment of CFRA management
The perceptions and actions of CFRA managers were inves-
tigated through management questionnaires and
semi-structured discussion. Management questionnaires
(Cooke 1994) were submitted to a total of seven qoliqoli
managers (five in Region 1, two in Region 2), and responses
were obtained from all seven.
The questionnaires sought information on the following
topics: (1) decisions affecting the CFRA; (2) boundaries of
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the CFRA; (3) access to the CFRA; (4) goodwill payments
(payments made for access); (5) management measures
adopted; (6) sources of information for management; (7)
poaching, dynamiting and other illegal activities; (8)
patrolling and enforcement; (9) women and fishing; (10)
mangroves; (11) management perceptions and policy; (12)
CFRAs and the law, and the need for reform. Questionnaire
responses were supplemented by semi-structured discussion
with the managers of all CFRAs other than Ba, the Chief of
which chose not to discuss management in person with us,
but took considerable care over completion of the question-
naire.
Working from the questionnaire responses, practices of
the CFRA owners which might reasonably be regarded as
constituting ‘management’ were identified under each of the
following: (1) management structure, (2) marshalling of
information for management, (3) the approach adopted with
regard to goodwill payments, (4) specific measures taken or
contemplated, (5) patrolling and enforcement (Table 1). In
each case, a score of one or zero was assigned according to
whether a given management practice was present or absent,
respectively. Thus, the CFRAs exhibiting the greatest
number of defined management measures received the
highest scores.
Background information on the CFRAs was gathered to
supplement the questionnaire responses. Particular attention
was paid to circumstances of managers which might affect
their freedom or inclination to act in a managerial manner.
Naturally, it cannot be guaranteed that all pertinent factors
came to light, especially during a brief investigation of this
kind. In this respect, the third author was able to provide
valuable insights into the workings of the Fijian social system
that might have been closed to foreign investigators working
alone.
Results
Over 90% of the fishing vessels in Region 1 were locally
constructed 8 m half-cabin plywood boats accommodating
crews of 3–4 fishers and powered with 40 hp outboard
motors. Most vessels possessed a wooden icebox for the
storage of ice and catch during fishing trips, and these were
typically of about 1 m3 in volume, permitting a maximum
catch per trip of about 400 kg, according to fishers inter-
viewed. Trip length varied from one to five days according to
location. Vessel usage was about 40 weeks per year, with an
average of 2–4 nights per week and an average catch of 100
kg per night. These data indicate an annual catch per boat of
approximately 10 t. In Region 1, approximately 300 fishers
purchased 1400 t of ice in pellet form annually from the
Lautoka and Ba ice plants, constituting 4.7 t per boat per
year.
Vessels in Region 2 were full-cabined and adapted for
longer fishing trips in heavy rainfall. Personnel of the fish-
eries company PAFCO at Levuka who sold ice to fishers
reported a typical trip length of one week. Trips of one week
294 A.J. Cooke, N.V.C. Polunin and K. Moce
Table 1 Aspects of CFRA management used to derive a comparative management index.
Class of management action Specific attribute
Management structure Chief personally involved in management
Existence of management committee
Marshalling information Hearsay or general common knowledge relied on
Meetings held as and when needed
Regular meeting held to discuss CFRA management
Input invited from Fisheries Division
Input invited from fishers
Input invited from other users such as women
Fishers’ information used to monitor management
Approach to goodwill payments Fixed goodwill payments used
Fixed payments increased in the last 5 years
No payment required but entry to fishery restricted
Payments scaled according to type of gear used
High goodwill payment deliberately used to limit fishing effort
Measures taken or contemplated Standard permits with conditions endorsed used
Reef area bans
Gears restricted (not merely through supplementary fees)
Bêche-de-mer fishing banned
Subsistence fishing zone or fishing reserve
Sunday fishing banned
Area ban extended to land
Mangrove area bans contemplated
Patrolling and enforcement Honorary Fisheries Wardens appointed
Active patrolling
Active steps taken to deal with illegalities
Illegalities reported to Fisheries
or more were the norm in the Verata area of Region 2 (K.
Passfield, personal communication 1994) and catches of about
10 t per vessel per year have been reported (Passfield 1994).
Licensing and management of CFRAs
Region 1: Tavua
Since Tavua is 680 km2 in area (of which 150 km2 is
composed of reef and 28 km2 mangrove) and since 127
commercial fishing permits were issued in 1993, it was the
best-subscribed CFRA in Region 1. Management was carried
out by the Tui Tavua in collaboration with the Fisheries
Officer for Tavua and the assistance of the Turaga ni koro
(village head). The management met at least annually and
solicited input from the Fisheries Division and fishers. No
goodwill payments were made by fishermen, but access was
limited to residents of Tavua Province. The fishers’ associ-
ation was expected to contribute to social projects. Fisheries
and the Chief operated a streamlined licensing procedure.
Management restrictions were set out in a standard form of
permit and included: (1) no bêche de mer (sea-cucumber)
fishing, (2) no taking of corals, (3) no netting across the
Korosi Pass, (4) a limit of 20 nets per fisher and minimum
mesh size of 7.5 cm (3 inches), and (5) reef closures at Marava
Reef (9 months in 1992 and all of 1994). Management also set
a limit each year to the number of permits, and was consid-
ering a novel rotation scheme for access to mangroves for
crab fishing which was popular. The Fisheries Officer
participated in naval fishing patrols, patrolled himself in a
Fisheries boat 10 times a year, and took a close interest in the
prosecution of dynamite fishing cases.
Votua
Since Votua is 1580 km2 in area (of which 210 km2 is
composed of reef and 60 km2 mangrove), it is amongst the
largest CFRAs in Region 1 and was well subscribed; 103
permits were issued in 1989, 119 in 1990, only 54 in 1993, but
this went up to 86 by mid 1994. Management was undertaken
by a 10-member committee representing the three yavusa
making up the original vanua of Votua and which met regu-
larly 4–5 times a year; the local Fisheries officer usually
attended. Information was solicited from fishers and
Fisheries personnel. Decisions were made by simple vote or
by the three Chiefs. Access fees in 1994 were F$100 for
Fijians and F$300 for Indo-Fijians, the latter also subject to
a supplement of F$200 for use of nets. Fees had been
increased in 1989 and 1994. Management measures (specified
on a standard form permit) included: (1) no shrimp netting in
Ba estuary, which was limited to Votuans, (2) no taking of
under-size bêche-de-mer (bêche-de-mer fishing was totally
banned in 1992), (3) no taking of clam or pearl shells, (4) no
fishing in Nadele-Qwana mangrove area, and (5) no use of
dynamite. Conditions (2) and (5) repeated government regu-
lations. Consultation with the Fisheries Division appeared to
be limited to attendance by Fisheries officers at CFRA meet-
ings, although on a few occasions the local Fisheries officer
had accompanied Votuan fishers making checks on passing
fishing boats. Honorary Fishing Wardens had been
appointed and there were frequent patrols. There was no
indication of reporting to Fisheries or police; rather, the
Votuans tended to take matters into their own hands, some-
times through threat of violence. It is likely that Votua was
collecting goodwill payments at the expense of neighbouring
CFRAs, because fishers very rarely paid more than one good-
will fee, yet it was believed by CFRA owners and Fisheries
officers that fishers licensed to fish in Votua often fished in
adjacent areas.
Ba
Since Ba is 200 km2 in area (of which 65 km2 is composed of
reef and 5 km2 mangrove), it is a small CFRA and relatively
well subscribed, with 32 permits issued in 1993. Meetings
were not held and no input was solicited directly from
Fisheries or fishers, reliance being based on hearsay; in fact,
the Chief confirmed that she lacked information for manage-
ment. A fixed goodwill payment of F$200 was applied, which
was increased from F$100 in 1993 to reflect the rise in the
price of fish. The only management measure to date had been
closure of Malevu Reef in order to: (1) alleviate bait fishing
pressure, (2) protect corals, (3) protect fragile vegetation of
the small island, and (4) stop uncontrolled bêche-de-mer
fishing. No standard form permit was issued, the above rules
being transmitted verbally. There was no evidence of cooper-
ation with the Fisheries Division, and no indication of any
patrolling, although Honorary Fisheries Wardens had been
appointed, but no special steps had been taken to deal with
illegalities.
Vitogo
Since Vitogo is 240 km2 in area (of which 65 km2 is composed
of reef and 14 km2 mangrove) and with an estimated 40
permits (management kept no adequate records) issued in
1993, it was relatively well subscribed. For management
purposes, information was not marshalled, however, and no
meetings were held. Payment of some goodwill to the Tui
Vitogo (not the Tunuloa yavusa) was indicated, but no details
were given. Fishers’ responses to questionnaires, which were
completed when filing licence applications at Lautoka
Fisheries office, indicated that goodwill paid to the Vitogo
Chief amounted to F$40–50 or a gift of yaqona (ceremonial
drink derived from the root of a plant), but only in some
cases. There was no evidence of any management measures,
cooperation with the Fisheries Division, patrolling or
enforcement.
Region 2: Verata
The combined CFRAs have a total surface area of 1033 km2,
of which 103 km2 is composed of reef and 15 km2 mangrove.
Verata No. 2 comprises mostly open water in a remote area
and thus it is likely that Verata No. 1 (110 km2, of which 43
km2 is composed of reef and 15 km2 mangrove) attracts most
of the fishing pressure. Eleven permits were issued in 1993,
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and 23 in 1994. Management was carried out by relatives of
the Tui Verata, who lived in the capital. Meetings were held
as and when the need arose, with women specifically included
and reflecting the importance of the subsistence fishery.
Goodwill fees for commercial fishing were very high at
F$1000 (increased from F$500 in 1992), and were intended
to keep down the number of fishers, although an undisclosed
‘reduced rate’ applied to local fishers. The conditions of
every permit were stated to include: (1) no fishing close to
Verata village (to protect the subsistence fishery, (2) no spear
fishing, (3) no fishing at night, and (4) separate permit
required for nets. No standard form of permit was used. No
Honorary Fisheries Wardens had been appointed and no
patrolling or enforcement measures were adopted, the view
apparently being taken that control of abuses was not feasible.
Kubuna
Since Kubuna is 300 km2 in area, of which 150 km2 is
composed of reef and 12 km2 mangrove, it is particularly
rich in reefs (50% of the total area). A noteworthy feature
of Kubuna was the high goodwill fee (F$1000) intended to
restrain the number of vessels, and only 16 permits were
issued in 1993. Management was effected by the Chief in
close consultation with the Fisheries Officer for Nausori.
Informal meetings between the Chief and the Fisheries
Officer were held only as and when needed, and this was
not regular. Management relied and acted upon the
recommendations of the Fisheries Division. Information
was not solicited directly from fishers. Goodwill was a
fixed payment of F$1000 irrespective of gear and had last
been increased in 1991; the high fee was expressly
intended to limit fishing effort. Other management
measures, including a ban on bêche-de-mer fishing with
scuba gear and on Sunday fishing, were set out in a stan-
dard form of permit. Individual fishers had been banned
for non-payment or late payment of goodwill. The fishing
ground was closed entirely for the whole of 1990 to mark
the death of the previous Chief. Honorary Fisheries
Wardens had been appointed and patrolling was effected
by them as well as other local fishers and the Fisheries
Division. Patrolling was, however, considered by the
owner to be insufficient to deter most poachers. The
activities of licensed fishers were ‘closely monitored’ for
contravention of the permit conditions. Illegalities were
reported by Fisheries to the Chief and dealt with according
to the law.
Levuka
Levuka has a total area of 351 km2, of which 95 km2 is
composed of reef and ,1 km2 mangrove. Permits had varied
in number, being 24 in 1988, 29 in 1989, 38 in 1990 (when
nearby Kubuna was closed), 22 in 1992, 6 in 1993 and 10 in
1994. Management was effected by the Chief, who relied on
hearsay information. There were no active management
measures, no management meetings were held and there
were no goodwill payments, although a traditional request
and presentation of yaqona had to be made to the Chief. The
Chief was setting certain rules which were: (1) closure of
Makogai Island for clam restocking (a project by the
Fisheries Division) and turtle nesting, (2) ban on use of
compressed air, especially for bêche-de-mer fishing, and (3)
ban on coral collecting. There was no cooperation as such
with the Fisheries Division. One Honorary Fisheries Warden
had been appointed, and did some patrolling, but there was
no active patrolling by the owner.
Comparisons of CFRAs
The CFRAs varied in total area, in reef area and in the
number of licences (Table 2), and the number of licences per
CFRA in 1993 was strongly positively correlated with reef
area (r2
adj
5 0.72, p 5 0.005). The number of licences per
unit area differed amongst the CFRAs (Table 2). Tavua had
the greatest number of licences per unit both of total and of
reef area. Verata had the fewest licences per unit of CFRA
area, while Levuka had the fewest licences per unit of reef
area (Table 2).
Management indices also spanned a considerable range
between one for Vitogo and 18 for both Tavua and Votua
(Table 3). Overall, management index was not correlated
with reef area for all CFRAs. However, if Vitogo, where
chiefly succession had broken down, was excluded, manage-
ment was significantly associated with reef area, although not
total CFRA area (r2
adj
5 0.59, p 5 0.046).
Overall, across all CFRAs, there was no significant
relationship between management index and number of
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Table 2 Area and licence (1993 except where indicated) data for the CFRAs
Region CFRA CFRA area (km2) Reef area (km2) Fishing licences Licences per km2 CFRA Licences per km2 reef
1 Tavua 680 150 127 0.187 0.847
Votua 1580 210 86a 0.054 0.409
Ba 200 65 32 0.160 0.492
Vitogo 240 65 40b 0.167 0.615
2 Verata 1033 103 23a 0.022 0.223
Kubuna 300 150 16 0.053 0.107
Levuka 351 95 10a 0.028 0.105
a
5 1994 data
b
5 estimated
licences per CFRA. However, a significant correlation
between management and number of licences was found for
Regions 1 and 2, if Vitogo was excluded (r2
adj
5 0.61, p 5
0.041), although there was no correlation between manage-
ment index and access pressure (number of permits per unit
area either of total CFRA or reef within the CFRA).
Kubuna, Verata and Votua had low access pressure, but
possessed a responsive management, while Vitogo and Ba
both had low levels of management although experiencing
substantial access pressure (Fig. 2). Tavua showed evidence
of having strong management in the face of high access
pressure, while Levuka had little management with low
access pressure (Fig. 2).
Discussion
The most significant finding from the present study is that
stakeholder management varied in extent and character
amongst the CFRAs studied around Viti Levu. Some areas,
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Table 3 Management scores and management indices for the CFRAs by category of management (– 5 not applicable).
Class of management action CFRA
Tavua Votua Ba Vitogo Verata Kubuna Levuka
Management structure
Chief is personally involved in management 1 – 1 0 0 1 1
Management committee exists 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Marshalling of information
Hearsay or general common knowledge relied on 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Meetings held as and when needed 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Regular meeting held to discuss CFRA management 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
Input invited from Fisheries Division 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Input invited from fishers 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Input invited from other users such as women 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Fishers’ information used to monitor management 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Approach to goodwill payments
Fixed goodwill payments used – 1 1 0 1 1 0
Fixed payments increased in the last 5 years – 1 1 0 1 1 0
No payment required but entry to fishery restricted 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payments scaled according to types of gear used – 1 0 0 1 0 0
High goodwill payment deliberately used to limit fishing 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Measures taken or contemplated
Use standard permits with conditions endorsed 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Reef area bans 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Gears restricted (not merely supplementary fees) 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
Bêche-de-mer banned 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
Subsistence fishing zone or fishing reserve 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Sunday fishing banned 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Area ban extended to land 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
Mangrove area bans contemplated 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Patrolling or enforcement
Honorary Fisheries Wardens appointed 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Active patrolling 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Active steps taken to deal with illegalities 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Illegalities reported to Fisheries 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Management index 18 18 8 1 11 13 5
Figure 2 Plot of management index against artisanal-fishery
access pressure (number of licences per unit area of reef ) in
the seven CFRAs.
notably Tavua and Votua, indicated quite a high degree of
management, while others exhibited very little or, in the case
of Vitogo, effectively no management. We acknowledge that
the relative weighting of management variables (Table 2)
might have varied, and if so, this weighting would have influ-
enced the results obtained. However, for the time being, we
can see no objective basis for weighting management 
variables, and therefore treated such variables as being
equally important as each other. We suggest that the
approach which we have used might be applied elsewhere in
the South Pacific, where appropriate tenure systems exist and
it is thought these might be enhanced to support effective
management of marine resources (e.g. Dalzell et al. 1996).
Clearly, there is reason to assess management regimes,
because these are not all the same, and successful achieve-
ment of investment objectives in projects to elucidate or
enhance such management will rely on such information
being available.
A factor which appeared markedly to affect the degree of
management was chiefly succession. Vitogo, which evinced
no management aptitude, almost had suffered a breakdown in
succession of its ownership. However, Votua, which had also
suffered a breakdown in chiefly succession, scored highly on
management aptitude. It is worth briefly reviewing what had
actually happened in these two cases. The fact is that while
chiefly succession of Votua had broken down, in the sense
that the original chiefly family had become extinct, it seems
that this had not itself led to a breakdown in management.
Rather, the situation of joint ownership appeared to have
encouraged a sense of rivalry between the three yavusa to
contribute the most effectively to management. In Vitogo,
however, chiefly power and CFRA ownership had been split
between two rival families, compromising management.
Since Vitogo was also in an area of relatively high fishing
pressure, this CFRA may be considered to have been vulnerable
to fishing pressure. While clearly a desirable route to successful
management, management involving both government and
local institutions (e.g. Jentoft 1989; Nielsen & Vedsmond 1999)
apparently depends on stability of those institutions if it is to be
reliable and sustainable. In countries other than Fiji, such as in
the Philippines (e.g. Russ & Alcala 1996) and St Lucia in the
Caribbean (H.A. Oxenford, personal communication 1998),
arrangements for local fishery closures have also proven vulner-
able to changes in the local institutions involved.
Apart from Vitogo, the two CFRAs with the lowest scores,
namely Ba and Levuka, were those which had no recorded
connection with the government. Verata, which scored a little
better than these, was assisted partially by a member of the
acting Chief ’s family who occupied a senior position in the
Ministry for Fijian Affairs, and took a personal interest in
administration of the vanua to which she belonged.
Originally, we sought data on total fishing pressure and
catch rates from the various CFRAs; however, these proved
not to be available through Fisheries and, in particular, no such
information was available to the CFRA managers. What we
did therefore was to use the absolute number of licences per
CFRA (which also permitted calculation of the number of
licences per unit of CFRA area or area of reef in the CFRA),
which was the sole measure of access pressure available to the
CFRA managers. A consequence of this is that we do not know
how much licensed fishers were exploiting resources in
CFRAs adjacent to those for which they had permits. We
suspect that certain CFRAs may essentially be ‘flags of conve-
nience’, where access to a CFRA is relatively easy and a
neighbouring CFRA is large and evidently productive.
Amongst the CFRAs which we investigated, none of the
managers was aware of the extent of such abuses, and although
Kubuna indicated that poaching might be substantial, such
recognition did not appear to have led to an appropriate adap-
tation of management regime.
Correlation between management index and the number of
permits in those six CFRAs where the chiefly authority was not
disrupted indicates that CFRA managers were, if anything,
more likely to respond to the number of permits than to access
pressure (measured as number of permits per unit area) within
their areas. However, this correlation was obtained only by
exclusion of Vitogo, and we advocate caution when interpreting
such relationships, given the qualitative nature of several of the
management characteristics involved, the small sample size and
the complexity of the situations concerned. In general, we are
inclined to conclude that the variation in management amongst
CFRAs which we observed could not readily be attributed to
factors such as the number or density of permits.
The existence of a privileged connection with Fisheries
was positively related to a higher degree of management, the
four highest-scoring CFRAs having some link with the
Fisheries Division. In the case of Tavua and Kubuna, this
involved inviting specific input from Fisheries, while for
Votua, it was only a matter of reporting illegalities to
Fisheries. One implication is that a link with the Fisheries
Division, and perhaps other government departments, is
associated with a more developed management regime. In
such cases, it would appear that a condition of co-manage-
ment has been achieved. Such instances support the notion
that ownership provides scope for greater local management,
because the owners stand to benefit from management (e.g.
Castilla & Fernandez 1998). It is worth noting, however, that
it remains unproven whether or not the high management
aptitude evinced by CFRAs such as Tavua, Votua and
Kubuna had led to conservation of fisheries stocks.
Of those CFRAs with Fisheries connections, however,
Votua scored highly in management while apparently solic-
iting little help from Fisheries. This highlights the fact that
cooperation with Fisheries is not necessary for a high
management index, according to the method which we used
to assess it. If a CFRA owner were sufficiently motivated to
act alone, then a high management index could still be
achieved. Votua had much scope for just such motivation
because, as we have noted, this grouping of three yavusa
owns no lands, the fishing ground being the only source of
revenue. Votua was in fact the only CFRA reputed to use
threat of violence to support its management regime.
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The present study has shown that a simple and rapid
survey technique can indicate useful contrasts amongst
CFRAs in functional management terms. Such results offer a
basis for guiding investments in projects to facilitate or
explore the development of local management, perhaps in the
context of elaborating strategies to promote local manage-
ment or co-management on a wider scale, as suggested by
IUCN (1993). Applying such an approach to the CFRAs of
this study, Vitogo presents a case of management in diffi-
culty, warranting direct support or research aimed at
identifying the causes of management breakdown so that
such problems can be avoided in other areas. If it were sought
through investment to understand better the circumstances
surrounding actual collaboration between Fisheries and local
management, then Tavua and Kubuna might be considered
useful foci for study. Votua would be a worthy target if the
objective were to understand better the conditions under
which more spontaneous management might arise.
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